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E. Allan Farnsworth*
Review of Standard Forms or Terms
Under the Vienna Convention
On January 1, 1988, the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods' took effect in the United States and in ten other coun-
tries.2 The initial list includes Argentina, France, Italy, and the People's
Republic of China, some of our most significant trading partners, with
more adherences soon to follow.3 In all likelihood the Convention,
popularly known as C.I.S.G. or the Vienna Convention, will soon be
governing law for most of our exports and imports of goods.
* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University; Professor
Farnsworth was the United States representative to the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") and to its Working Group on the
International Sale of Goods during the drafting of the Vienna Convention and was
co-chairman of the United States delegation to the diplomatic conference in Vienna
in 1980.
1. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980) [hereinafter C.I.S.G.
or Convention], reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
2. Art. 99(1) provides that the Convention becomes effective on the first day of
the month following twelve months after the tenth State deposits an instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 99(1),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 694 (1980). On Dec. 11, 1986, China, Italy and the United
States deposited ratification instruments, bringing the number of countries ratifying
the Convention to over ten. Thus, Jan. 1, 1988 became the Convention's effective
date for the eleven ratifying countries. These countries are Argentina, The People's
Republic of China, Egypt, France, Italy, Hungary, Lesotho, Syria, The United States
of America, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Bonell, Introduction to the Convention, in COMMEN-
TARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 1, 6-7
(C. Bianca & M. Bonell eds. 1987) [hereinafter Bianca & Bonell]. As of the date of
this publication, Australia, Austria, Finland, Mexico, Norway and Sweden have also
acceded to the Convention.
3. In the 18-month signatory period following the Convention's acceptance in
April, 1980, twenty-one countries became Signatory States. MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. V, VI (1983) (letter of submittal from Sect. of State George P.
Shultz) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT]. Art. 99(2) governs when the
Convention becomes effective for those Signatory States ratifying the Convention
after the initial ten ratifying states. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 99(2), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. at 694 (1980).
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Under article 1, the Convention "applies to contracts of sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different States"
when those States are parties to the Convention. 4 Where it applies, the
Convention supplies a framework of supplementary private law rules
governing such important matters as contract formation and interpreta-
tion, obligations of seller and buyer, remedies for breach, and excuse
based on changed circumstances. For international sales it thus replaces
the greater part of article 2, the Sales article, of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.5
A voluminous literature already has accumulated on whether the
United States should ratify the Convention and the effects of that ratifi-
cation. 6 This Article addresses a difficult question of current impor-
tance-one that now faces every American business that exports or
imports goods using its own standard forms or standard terms: What
revisions in those standard forms or terms should business consider in
light of the Convention?
I. A Tripartite Hierarchy
Two of the Convention's general articles are central to answering this
question. Article 6 empowers the parties to "exclude the application of
this Convention or ...derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions." Article 4 provides that, "except as otherwise expressly pro-
4. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 1(a), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 672 (1980). In ratify-
ing the Convention, the United States took advantage of a reservation permitted by
article 95 under which the United States is not bound by the language in article
l(1)(b) making the Convention applicable when "rules of private international law
lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State." C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art.
l(1)(b), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 672 (1980).
Congress cited two reasons for electing out of art. 1 (1)(b). First, Congress found
that international choice of law rules are uncertain and could lead to disharmony
between contracting parties. Applicability of the Convention based on art. I(a), how-
ever, is clear-cut; the Convention applies when the places of business of the buyer
and seller are in different Contracting States (Contracting States being those States
that have ratified, and therefore subject to, the Convention).
Second, Congress felt that art. 1(1)(b) would displace United States domestic law
more frequently than foreign law. For example, where the United States contracts
with a non-Contracting State, if private international law points to application of the
non-Contracting State's law, its domestic law applies. On the other hand, if private
international law points to application of United States law, art. 1 (1) (b) would dictate
application of the Convention. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 3, at 21
(Appendix B).
5. For example, the C.I.S.G. repeals the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds for sales
transactions. Under art. 11, "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evi-
denced by writing .... Arts. 12 and 96 permit a reservation avoiding the application
of this provision, but the United States did not make such a reservation.
6. For an excellent chronicle of much of this literature, see Note, Disclaimers of
Implied Warranties: The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 863 n.1 (1985). For an extensive bibliography
of English language commentary on the Vienna Convention see Winship, Bibliogra-
phy: International Sale of Goods, 18 INT'L LAW. 53 (1984) and its supplement, Winship,
A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations International Sales Convention, 21 INT'L
LAW. 585 (1987). See also Ackerman, infra at 535.
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vided," the Convention "is not concerned with... [t]he validity of the
contract or of any of its provisions," leaving validity to be determined by
the law applicable under choice of law rules.
7
Article 6 purports to give the parties an unqualified power to vary
the effect of the Convention by agreement.8 On the other hand, article
4 makes it clear that, absent a contrary provision, the Convention does
not affect any rule of domestic law dealing with the "validity" of a con-
tract provision. 9 Taken together, articles 6 and 4 create a tripartite hier-
archy, with domestic law on validity at the top, the agreement of the
parties in the middle, and the Convention at the bottom. The domestic
law on validity continues to control the agreement of the parties, and
both control the Convention. This subordination of the Convention to
both the domestic law on validity and the agreement of the parties was
part of the price paid by the Convention's sponsors for its acceptance by
adopting nations.
At first glance, the consequences of the hierarchy seem clear. Draft-
ers reviewing standard forms or terms need only consider situations
where the existing language is not dispositive, so that the provisions of
the Code or other applicable law are now relied on to supplement it.10
In these situations a drafter must compare the adequacy of Convention
provisions with their Code counterparts and consider whether the Con-
vention now makes additional language desirable. With regard to situa-
tions where existing language is dispositive, a drafter might well assume
that, since under article 6 the agreement of the parties controls the Con-
vention, no review of such provisions is necessary. With regard to situa-
7. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, arts. 4, 6. Because the Convention expressly excludes
issues of validity from its scope of coverage, the Convention's "gap-filling" provision,
art. 7(2), cannot be applied to resolve validity issues. Therefore, courts must look to
applicable domestic law on validity questions. See J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNrrED NArlONS CONVENTION 128 (1982)
[hereinafter HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALES LAW].
To determine applicable domestic law, courts must apply private international con-
flicts of law rules. In 1985, the Hague Conference of Private International Law
adopted a revision of the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law applicable to Interna-
tional Contracts for the Sale of Goods. This revised Hague Convention offers courts
uniform conflicts of law rules for choosing the domestic law that should be applied to
resolve questions outside the scope of the Vienna Convention. See Bonell, Introduc-
tion to the Convention, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 2, at 12-13.
8. Art. six goes beyond the comparable language of the Uniform Commercial
Code § 1-102(3), which allows parties to vary the effect of the Code's provisions by
agreement but which prohibits their disclaiming the Code's "obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care." U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978). Art. six sub-
jects drafters of standard forms to no such restraints.
9. The most obvious example of where the Convention nevertheless proposes to
affect domestic laws regulating validity is art. 11 which dispenses with the writing
requirement of the statute of frauds. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 11, reprinted in 19
I.L.M. at 674 (1980). Arts. 12 and 96, however, permit Contracting States to make a
reservation so that art. 11 does not apply where any party has his place of business in
that Contracting State. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, arts. 12, 96, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at
674, 693 (1980); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. This includes situations where there is no language at all and also where
existing language is to be supplemented by applicable law.
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tions where the form has been tailored to comply with domestic law on
validity, a drafter might also assume that, since under article four
domestic law continues to control validity questions, review of such pro-
visions is unnecessary.
A drafter who made these two assumptions would, however, be
doubly in error. The Convention calls for reconsideration of situations
where existing language is dispositive and of situations as to which that
language has been tailored to comply with domestic law, as well as of
situations in which that language is not dispositive and relies on applica-
ble law to supplement it. Three kinds of situations therefore merit con-
sideration: where language is dispositive, where language has been
tailored, and where language is not dispositive.
II. Language Is Dispositive
If the agreement controls the Convention, how can language, dispositive
prior to the Convention, require revision? Language could require revi-
sion because it now acquires a different meaning under the Convention.
An important example arises if the parties wish to choose the law of
New York, for instance, including the Uniform Commercial Code. Prior
to the Convention, it would have been sufficient to provide that "the law
of the State of New York" governed the contract. At first blush, such
language would seem sufficient to "exclude the application of [the] Con-
vention" under article six. A reference to New York law, however,
incorporates that part of federal law that a New York court would find
applicable, and the Convention is part of that federal law."l Language
that, prior to the Convention, referred to internal New York law, includ-
ing the Uniform Commercial Code, takes on a different meaning under
the Convention, referring now to the Convention and excluding the
greater part of the Uniform Commercial Code.
A party who wants to take advantage of article six to exclude the
Convention must revise that language. One possible phrasing is to
choose "the law of the State of New York excluding the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Other possibilities
include choosing "the internal domestic law of the State of New York"
or "the law of New York applicable to parties whose places of business
are in the United States."
Choice of law provides the most striking illustration of the point
that words in a provision may take on a different meaning under the
Convention, but it is not the only example. Consider, for instance, as
simple a phrase as "there are no warranties" in a seller's disclaimer.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, such plain language designates
as "warranties" a seller's obligations as to quality. 12 Under the Conven-
tion, however, there are, strictly speaking, no "warranties" even in the
11. See P. SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAw 36 (1986).
12. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALES LAW, supra note 7, at 222. The U.C.C.
addresses warranties under three headings: (1) express warranties, U.C.C. § 2-313
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absence of a disclaimer; the Convention speaks only of "obligations of
the seller" as to "conformity of the goods."1 3 Arguably, the phrase dis-
claims nothing under the Convention. The drafter of the seller's form
would do well to at least consider replacing the phrase with language
such as "there is no obligation of the seller as to conformity of the
goods."
I. Language Has Been Tailored
If domestic law on validity continues to control the parties' agreement,
how can language tailored to comply with that law invite revision? Such
language invites revision because the term "validity" contains shades of
meaning.
Consider again the example of the seller's disclaimer. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, a typical disclaimer reads "there are no war-
ranties including the WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY." Draft-
ers use this phrase because the Code requires that "to exclude or modify
the implied warranty of merchantability ... the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous."' 4 A pur-
ported disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability lacking the
twin requirements of mentioning merchantability and of conspicuous-
ness is ineffective. The Convention contains no such requirements.
The question therefore arises whether a seller, whose transaction would
otherwise be subject to the Convention, is bound by these Code provi-
sions as constituting provisions on "validity."
At least one commentator argues for defining "validity" so narrowly
that these Code requirements would not be requirements for "validity"
under the Convention. John Honnold contends that the Convention's
reference to "validity" should "not be read so broadly as to import
domestic rules that would supplant other articles of the Convention." 15
To impose the Code's requirements for exclusions of warranties, he
argues, supplants the provision of article eight, section 2 that contract
terms "are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a rea-
(1978); (2) implied warranty of merchantable quality, U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978); and (3)
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978). Id.
13. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 35, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 679 (1980). The term
"obligations of the seller" comes from the title of C.I.S.G., ch. II; "conformity of the
goods" comes from the title of § 2 of that chapter which contains art. 35. In drafting
the art. 35 treatment of the seller's obligation as to conformity, one objective was to
avoid the parochial terms characterizing national legal systems.
14. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
15. HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALES LAw, supra note 7, at 258-59. One might ask
whether, under Honnold's narrow interpretation of validity, a party could disclaim
the Code's non-disclaimable obligations of "good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care" since these are not issues of validity, but rather are "understandings"
between the parties covered under art. 8(2). See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978). Honnold
argues that rules such as U.C.C. § 1-102(3), which deny legal effect to provisions
even if they are clearly stated and understood by the parties, are clearly within the
scope of validity and therefore remain vital under art. 4(a). HONNOLD, UNIFORM
SALES LAw, supra note 7, at 258-59.
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sonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in
the same circumstances."'
16
Another writer challenged Honnold's view on the ground that it
treats the Code's requirements as "mere guidelines for interpreting the
parties' agreement rather than imperatives for valid disclaimers." 17 The
writer argued that the U.C.C.'s disclaimer provisions are requirements
for validity because the language is mandatory-that is, a disclaimer
clause is invalid if it does not meet the requirements.' 8 As long as
uncertainty remains, a prudent American seller may well hesitate to rely
on a narrow definition of "validity" and revise its language of disclaimer
so that it is no longer in compliance with the Code. 19
The Convention's definition of "validity" will have consequences in
other areas as well. Consider, for example, the Code's rule on firm
offers, under which language making an offer irrevocable "on a form
supplied by the offeree" is not effective unless "separately signed by the
offeror." 20 Under a broad definition of "validity," the Code's require-
ment of separate signing survives even under the Convention; under a
narrow definition it might not. As in the case of disclaimers, a prudent
response on the part of the drafter may well be to assume the worst and
comply with the Code's requirement.
IV. Language Is Not Dispositive
The situations most obviously calling for review by drafters occur when
the language is silent, relying on the provisions of the applicable law to
supplement it. In what areas is the Convention less satisfactory than, for
example, the Code as a source of supplementary rules? Three situations
come to mind.
One situation is risk of loss. While the Convention lays down gen-
eral rules for dealing with risk of loss,2 ' it contains nothing comparable
to the Code's provisions regarding the effect on risk of such common
trade terms as C.I.F.,22 F.O.B., 23 and F.A.S. 24 The drafters of the Con-
16. HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALES LAw, supra note 7, at 258-59.
17. Note, Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 870 (1985).
18. Id.
19. A foreign seller might feel more confident in relying on a narrow definition of
"validity" in failing to comply with the Code, even though the transactions might be
governed, for instance, by New York law. The wisdom of this, however, is
questionable.
20. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1978).
21. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, arts. 66-70, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 686-90.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-320 (1978). Under the Code, the term C.I.F. means that "the
price includes in a lump sum the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to
the named destination." This creates a shipment contract under which the buyer
assumes risk of loss or damage upon shipment of goods if the seller properly per-
formed all its obligations. Delivery to the carrier is delivery to the buyer for purposes
of risk and title. The insurance, although purchased by the seller, is included in the
purchase price and is for the buyer's benefit, to protect the buyer against the risk of
loss or damage in transit. U.C.C. § 2-320 comments 1, 3 (1978).
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vention, unlike those of the Code, thought such detail inappropriate for
legislation intended to withstand changes in commercial practices. Arti-
cle 67(1) of the Convention states the basic rule on risk where the con-
tract involves carriage of the goods. 25 If the seller is bound to hand the
goods over at a particular place, risk does not pass until the goods are
handed over at that place; if the seller is not so bound, then risk passes
when the goods are handed over to the first carrier. 26 This wording
might suggest that under a "C.I.F. Buyer's City" contract, risk would not
pass until the goods are handed over at Buyer's City, contrary to the
Code rule and the universal understanding that in C.I.F. contracts
transit risks fall on the buyer.2 7 The fact that the price paid by the buyer
includes the cost of insurance should suffice, however, to show the
intention of the parties to put the transit risk on the buyer, a rationale
used to reach that result at common law and that seems equally appro-
priate under article six.28 The Convention's lack of specific C.I.F. rules
comparable to those of the Code nevertheless makes it imperative for
contracting parties to provide such rules themselves, whether by incor-
poration of the International Chamber of Commerce's INCOTERMS
29
or otherwise.
A second matter on which the Convention is less satisfactory than
the Code is that of notice by a buyer of defects in the goods. Under the
Code, a buyer loses all right to claim damages for goods accepted unless
23. See U.C.C. § 2-319(l)(a)-(c) (1978). Under the Code,the term F.O.B. means
"free on board." A usual shipment order and confirmation will state that the ship-
ment is to be "F.O.B. seller's place of business" or "F.O.B. buyer's place of busi-
ness." The former is a shipment contract under which the seller is only obliged to
make "an appropriate contract for shipment and to get conforming goods into the
possession of the carrier." J. WnrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 5-2, at 217 (3d ed. 1988). Risk of loss shifts to the buyer upon delivery to the
carrier under U.C.C. § 2-509(l)(a) (1978). "F.O.B. [the buyer's place of business]"
is a destination contract under which the risk does not pass to the buyer until the
goods are tendered to the buyer at the place of destination. Id.
24. See U.C.C. § 2-319(2) (1978). F.A.S. means "free alongside" and is a delivery
term under which the seller assumes the risk of loss or damage of goods until the
goods are delivered alongside the named vessel at a named port.
25. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 67(1), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 686.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 22.
28. This rationale will not, however, serve to put the transit risk on the buyer in
the case of a C. & F. contract. A C. & F. contract means that the price includes cost
and freight, but not insurance, to the named destination. U.C.C. § 2-320(1) (1978).
As with a C.I.F. contract, the Code nevertheless passes title and risk of loss to the
buyer on shipment under C. & F. contracts on the ground that the term is often used
where "the buyer is in a more advantageous position than the seller to effect insur-
ance on the goods or... has in force an 'open' or 'floating' policy covering all ship-
ments." U.C.C. § 2-320(3) (1978); U.C.C. § 2-320 comment 16 (1978).
29. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR THE
INTERPRETATION OF TRADE TERMS, PUB. No. 350 (1980). INCOTERMS offer a large
menu of trade terms that depart from the traditional and somewhat outmoded C.I.F.
terms. INCOTERMS take account of the problems posed by containerization, where
passage of risk at the ship's rail may be inappropriate, and high technology goods,
where it may be desirable to keep the risk on the seller.
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the buyer notifies the seller of the breach "within a reasonable time after
he discovers or should have discovered any breach." °3 0 Drafting a com-
parable provision for the Convention produced a tug of war between
developing and developed countries that threatened the success of the
Vienna diplomatic conference that put the Convention in final form.3 1
Continental European countries often have short statutory periods, such
as a year or six months, within which a buyer must give notice.3 2 Repre-
sentatives of developing countries feared that such a short period would
disadvantage their importers who might have difficulty determining
defects in manufactured goods and might also suffer from unreliable
means of communication, obstacles not faced by an importer of raw
materials in a developed country.
33
Article 39(1) thus begins, much as the Code does, by requiring a
buyer to "give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of
conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought
to have discovered it." Article 44 adds an exception, however, insisted
on by the developing countries, that allows the buyer to nevertheless
claim damages "if [the buyer] has a reasonable excuse for his failure to
give the required notice." This exception is itself subject to an excep-
tion, inserted at the behest of the developed countries, that excludes
from such recovery damages "for loss of profit."'3 4 In addition, article
39(2), also at the behest of the developed countries, requires the buyer
in any event "to give the seller notice" within a period of two years at
the latest. In summary, the buyer must notify the seller "within a rea-
sonable time" unless the buyer "has a reasonable excuse," but in that
case the buyer cannot recover "for loss of profits," and in any event the
buyer must notify the seller within two years.3 5 Buyers as well as sellers
may well want to replace this unwieldy and vague rule with a require-
ment that notice be given within a specified period of time.
Changed circumstances is a third matter on which the Convention is
less satisfactory than the Code. Under article four, the Convention does
not apply if existing circumstances give rise to questions of mistake
affecting validity.3 6 The Convention's provisions on "exemption" in
article 7937 reflect a compromise between the common law and civil law
30. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
31. For a brief description of the deadlock over this issue and ensuing proposals,
see Sono, Art. 44-Failure to Notify, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 2, at 324-25.
32. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALES LAW, supra note 7, at 281 n.5 (examples of
domestic limitations on time for notice of defects include: Sweden, one year; Swit-
zerland, six months; Mexico, five days from receipt for quality and quantity and 30
days from receipt for inherent defects).
33. See id. at 278, 281 n.5 for legislative history of debate.
34. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 44, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 681.
35. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, arts. 39, 44, reprinted in 19 1.L.M. at 680, 681.
36. Under art. four, the Convention does not apply if existing circumstances give
rise to questions of mistake that affect validity.
37. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 79, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 689. Under art. 79, a
party is not liable for failure to perform if failure is due to an impediment beyond his
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doctrines regarding changed circumstances. 38 Barry Nicholas, who rep-
resented the United Kingdom in negotiations concerning this article,
wrote that the difficulty in defining the circumstances in which "exemp-
tion" will occur "lay in producing a formula which would have the same
meaning in different legal systems."'39 Although the Convention's solu-
tion has the attraction of seeming to incorporate both common law and
civil law doctrines, such a compromise can scarcely escape being illusory
for jurists from both systems. 40 A prudent drafter of a clause to cover
changed circumstances under the Convention should consider making
its language self-sufficient--exclusive of the Convention-with respect
not only to excusing the seller in cases of impracticability of perform-
ance but also to excusing the buyer in cases of frustration of purpose.
As to these three matters, the burden of revising existing forms may
not be as great as first appears. Many forms for international sales
already incorporate INCOTERMS, require that the buyer notify the
seller of defects within a specified period of time, and contain detailed
provisions dealing with changed circumstances. Although the drafter
must be careful to make sure that the special needs of the Convention
are met, thorough rewriting is not likely to be needed. Nor is the drafter
likely to see a compelling need to oust the Convention by choosing
another law.
Conclusion
Articles six and four of the Convention create a tripartite hierarchy in
which the Convention lies at the bottom, the agreement of the parties is
in the middle, and the domestic law on validity rests on top. Prudent
drafters ought to re-examine language for the international sale of
goods, even when such language is dispositive, to protect the special
needs of their clients in light of this new tripartite hierarchy. Among the
areas drafters should review are choice of law, sellers' disclaimers, risk
of loss, buyers' notice of defects, and changed circumstances provisions.
Although careful review is necessary, drafters likely will not need to
engage in thorough rewriting or oust the Convention entirely by choos-
ing another law.
control that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken into account, avoided
or overcome at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Id.
38. See Tallon, Art. 79-Exemptions, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 2, at 572-75 for
a description of common and civil law on exemptions and the Convention's attempt
to develop a system of exemptions independent of pre-existing systems. See generally
Nicholas, Force Majeur and Frustration, 27 AM.J. COMP. L. 231 (1979) (discussion of the
exemption provisions in the draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, art. 65 (1978)).
39. Nicholas, supra note 38, at 232.
40. The autonomy from pre-existing systems that the Convention attempts frus-
trates interpretation of art. 79 because the Convention rejects use of words and con-
cepts accepted in domestic law. Thus, drafters and courts cannot resort to these laws
as a guide to interpretation. Tallon, Art. 79-Exemptions, in Bianca & Bonell, supra
note 2, at 574.

